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The reporting of disasters, crises and human suffering has become a regular feature of 
modern media. Scenes of tragedy and catastrophe are part of the everyday experience 
of audiences, who are invited to virtually participate in the suffering of distant others. In 
this article, I approach the witnessing of mediated suffering as a distinct modality of 
audience practice, which differs fundamentally from other forms of media experience, 
and therefore cannot be addressed within traditional conceptualisations of audience 
engagement with the media. Due to its close ties to human suffering, media witnessing 
is underlined by two main characteristics: first, its affective nature, due to its relation to 
human vulnerability, pain and trauma; second, its cultural endowment with a sense of 
responsibility to interfere with and act upon the suffering witnessed.  
As such, media witnessing is also central to broader debates about media ethics 
in a globalised media environment and the possibility of the mediation of a 
cosmopolitan outlook as the ability and willingness to situate and relativise Ǯoneǯs own form of life within other horizons of possibilityǯ and see Ǯoneself from the perspective of cultural othersǯ ȋBeck, ʹͲͲ͸: ͺͻȌ. Studies on the mediation of distant suffering have 
illustrated the role of media, as technologies and as texts, in differently situating the 
viewers in a moral relationship to the distant victims by making distinct demands on 
their political and emotional sensibilities (Chouliaraki, 2006; Cottle and Rai, 2008; Joey, 
2009). These questions, however, have been largely unexplored within the field of 
audience studies. In the few notable examples audience engagement with distant 
suffering has been mostly addressed either in terms of compassion, varied in its 
expressions (Höijer, 2004), in terms of (in)action with regard to humanitarian appeals 
(Seu, 2003) or as indifference (Scott, 2014).    
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My concern in this paper is, therefore, twofold. First, drawing upon theoretical 
work on the concept of media witnessing (Ellis, 2000; Peters, 2001; Frosh, 2006; Frosh 
and Pincevski, 2009), I develop an analytical framework for the exploration of audience 
engagement with news of distant suffering. Second, applying this framework on an 
empirical study of Greek audiences talking about distant disasters, the article provides a 
typology of media witnessing that allows for the exploration of the particularities of 
watching human suffering that go beyond expressions of compassion or pity.  
 
Media witnessing: from theoretical concept to analytical framework 
Media witnessing as conceptualised here is tied to moments of crisis. Despite the potential of the media to turn their viewers into Ǯmundane witnessesǯ of less disturbing or Ǯlightǯ events (Ellis, 2009), central to the concept of media witnessing as employed 
here are the imaginative moral demands images of suffering make to their spectators. In 
this context, Sontag defines mediated witnessing as Ǯbeing a spectator of calamities taking place in another countryǯ through the Ǯcumulative offering by more than a century and halfǯs worth of those specialised tourists known as journalistsǯ ȋSontag, 
2003: 18). Although, witnessing has evolved throughout the twentieth century through 
the different electronic media, it is in television that the specific modality of experience 
has been traditionally exemplified (Ellis, 2000: 10). The overabundance of detail found 
in the audio-visual, the details of the image and the Ǯatmosphereǯ of the sound instigate Ǯa pervasive sense of liveness and intimacyǯ ȋEllis, ʹͲͲͲ: ͳʹȌ. )t is this mediated sense of 
intimacy that forms the basis of the emotional implications of witnessing. Watching 
suffering, even if only on the screen, is emotionally compelling due to the knowledge 
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that this suffering is real, is actually happening, a sense enhanced by the Ǯreal-effectǯ of 
the audio-visual.  
If the audio-visual mediation of suffering forms the basis for the emotional 
character of witnessing, its liveness, the fact that it takes place simultaneously to the act 
of viewing, is what renders media witnessing morally compelling. Simultaneous 
suffering poses questions about what can be done to alleviate it, urging its viewers to 
take a moral stance vis-à-vis what they see on the screen and act in the present (Peters, 
2001: 721). In this context, media witnessing is a second or even third-order kind of 
witnessing. Journalists, by being there, are the actual witnesses the testimony of whom 
the audiences come to receive; they can also be themselves receivers of the witnessing 
testimony of the actual victims, the primary witnesses of the disaster and trauma. The 
witnessing of the audience in this chain of events is restricted to attending to the 
testimonies of the journalists, their witnessing texts. Although the focus here is on the 
audiences as witnesses, the complex relationship between primary and secondary 
witnessing in not to be dismissed or ignored but is implicated in the complexity of 
media witnessing as an analytical category.  
Witnessing is a semantically challenging concept. It can refer to an actor (who 
bears witness), an act (bearing witness), a statement or text (witnessing testimony) or the Ǯinward experience that authorises the statement ȋthe witnessing of an eventȌǯ 
(Peters, 2001: 709). In this sense, as Peters puts it, it is intelligible to claim that Ǯthe 
witness (speech-actȌ of the witness ȋpersonȌ was witnessed ȋby an audienceȌǯ ȋPeters, 
2001: 709). Approaching audiences as witnesses involves tensions and complexities that go beyond the concept of Ǯviewersǯ or Ǯspectatorsǯ. Media witnessing collapses three 
different practices: audiences become witnesses themselves, vicariously experiencing 
events that happen elsewhere; they become witnesses of the witnessing victims, the 
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people that give testimony of their suffering on the screen; and, finally, they are 
witnesses of the witnessing texts, those of the journalists that bear witness to the events 
taking place. Media witnessing thus conflates but also presupposes this three-fold 
distinction, highlighted by Frosh and Pinchevski: Ǯbetween witnesses ǲinǳ the media, 
witnessing ǲbyǳ the media, and witnessing ǲthroughǳ the mediaǯ ȋFrosh and Pinchevski, 
2009: 1; emphasis in the original). Far from being a mere semantic game, I argue that 
this distinction is central to the complexity of media witnessing and analytically useful 
for the exploration of how audiences experience the world through the position of a 
witness.  
Becoming witnesses Ǯthroughǯ the media, viewers are confronted with a kind of Ǯpainful knowledgeǯ, which is accompanied by Ǯan aching sense that something must be doneǯ for the alleviation of the suffering witnessed ȋEllis, ʹͲͲͲ: ͳͳȌ. Knowing about the 
pain of others implies, in cultural and social terms, complicity in their suffering and the 
moral obligation to act for its alleviation. Witnessing, thus, goes beyond the act of Ǯseeingǯ or Ǯwatchingǯ; it implies a kind of participation, albeit vicarious and fleeting, to 
the events presented on the screen (Rentschler, 2004: 298; Peters, 2001: 708). At the 
same time, however, the geographical distance separating the viewer from the 
unfortunates undermines the moral impulse to act upon the suffering.  The combination 
of the sense of involvement in the events that knowledge of them provides with the 
sense of powerlessness that distance perpetuates finds itself at the heart of media 
witnessing. Exploring the experience of witnessing through the media, therefore, poses 
the question of how viewers position themselves vis-à-vis images of human pain, 
compelling in their sensational visibility but remote in their mediated representation.  
As witnesses of the witnesses Ǯinǯ the media, the distant sufferers, viewers make 
imaginative connections with the distant victims whose suffering they watch on their 
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screens. For Ellis, this kind of imaginative connections seems to reside in the 
management of distance through the audio-visual illusions of Ǯtherenessǯ and Ǯlivenessǯ 
(Ellis, 2000: 1). Silverstone rightfully reminds us that mediated distance is a 
manageable category dependent on the media representational practices, which Ǯcontinually swings between incorporation ȋthat is denial of both difference and distanceȌ or annihilation ȋthat is denial of both common humanity and distanceȌǯ 
(Silverstone, 2002: 770). Audiences are on a daily basis confronted with distant events 
that are either framed into recognisable and familiar patterns, thus denied their specificity and Ǯothernessǯ, or deprived of an explanatory framework and therefore 
exaggerated in their difference and stereotyped as incomprehensible and foreign 
(Silverstone, 2007: 48). In this context, distance also becomes a moral category, defining the limits and ways of the viewerǯs relationship with the distant other.  Finally, the viewersǯ relationship to witnessing Ǯbyǯ the media, the journalistic 
accounts, pertains to questions of trust in the media. Witnessing as a practice entails the 
transformation of experience to discourse, of private sensation to public words, and as 
such, Peters argues, is vulnerable to the inescapable losses of such a process and marked by an inherent Ǯveracity gapǯ ȋPeters, ʹͲͲͳ: ͹ͳͳȌ. The veracity gap becomes 
even more prominent in the case of broadcasting, where distance accentuates the 
distrust and doubt in the mediation of experience among people who have no physical 
proximity or first-hand knowledge of it. This observation points to the complexities of the relationship of the audiences with the Ǯwitnessing textsǯ, posing questions of 
attributed authenticity and trust, central to the nature of media witnessing as a Ǯcultural achievementǯ ȋFrosh, ʹͲͲ͸: ʹ͹ͲȌ. Such questions are entangled with the viewerǯs 
experience, not necessarily as readily formulated ontological arguments of disbelief 
(ǮDid this really happen?ǯ) but as complexities in the relationship with the media text 
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itself (ǮIs the image representative of everything that happened? What is left out?ǯ). They 
are ultimately questions addressing the evaluative assumptions about the media that underline viewersǯ positioning towards the suffering witnessed and their trust in media 
representational practices.  
Addressing audience exposure to distant suffering as realised at the intersection 
of these three dimensions allows for the full exploration of the complexity of the 
vicarious experience of mediated suffering. Despite the recent increased interest in the 
mediation of distant suffering as part of a broader Ǯmoral turnǯ ȋOng, ʹͲͲͻ) in the field 
of media studies, as well as the implicit assumption that the media render their 
audiences witnesses to atrocities and human pain, the concept of media witnessing has 
remained analytically barren and empirically unexplored within the limited number of 
empirical studies of the audience of suffering.  
In one of the few studies in the field, Höijer describes the complexity of audience 
engagement with media reports of war as an interplay between compassion, most often 
directed to particular images of suffering, and indifference (Höijer, 2004: 528). Focusing 
on audience responses to NGO campaigns and news stories of human rights violations, 
Seu has illustrated the different ways people discursively distance themselves from the 
suffering of others and justify their unresponsiveness to human rights appeals (Seu, 
2003; 2010). In a more recent study, Scott explored the different mediated encounters 
with distant suffering beyond the genre of television news and has concluded that Ǯindifference and solitary enjoymentǯ is the outcome of most of these encounters ȋScott, 
2014: 3).  
Significant in their own right, these studies seem to Ǯmeasureǯ audience 
engagement in terms of two factors, namely compassion or action. What ultimately 
underlines them is an approach to audience engagement with the suffering of others as 
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a direct response to media images as witnessing texts. What is neglected, and what 
media witnessing as developed here highlights, is that audience responses are mediated 
not only by the media texts as representations but also the viewersǯ evaluations of these 
representations, as well as broader discursive frameworks of everyday life. In this 
context, audience witnessing is often tied with and contingent on the media as 
witnessing texts; but it also diverges and moves away from these texts as it is further 
mediated by alternative frameworks of understanding. This relationship between 
audiences and media texts is not unique to the case of witnessing suffering but a 
broader characteristic of the intertextuality of mediation, in so far as Ǯsocial resources 
and experiences are drawn upon in the reception and interpretation of the mediaǯ 
(Fairclough, 1992: 204). In that respect, the typology of audience engagement provided 
here might not be unique to the experience of witnessing suffering. What makes these 
responses meaningful and unique in this case, however, is that they are responses to the 
culturally embedded expectations to react to the suffering of other people, implicit in 
the experience of media witnessing.   
 
Exploring media witnessing 
Taking these analytical concerns as a starting point, the rest of the paper discusses 
empirical material based on a study of Greek audiences. The analysis draws on material 
of twelve focus group discussions, including forty seven participants in total. 
Participants varied in terms of gender, educational level, occupation and age, with the 
younger cohort consisting of people in their twenties and the older of participants in 
their forties and fifties. Groups were homogeneous and consisted of peers, a choice 
made on the basis that since peer groups pre-exist the research context, their discourses 
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can be seen as reflective of the participantsǯ everyday life (Sasson, 1995: 20). The 
methodology of focus groups was used on the premises that it is through the interaction 
of discussion that common sense discourses are more vividly negotiated and illustrated 
(Billig, 2002: 16-17). Discussions were triggered by questions about three major 
disasters, namely the Southeast Asian tsunami of 2004, Hurricane Katrina and the 
Kashmir earthquake of 2005, however they expanded to a number of other events and 
issues respondents found relevant and pertinent to the topic of distant suffering.  
The analysis of the focus group material takes as a point of departure the three-
dimensional nature of media witnessing addressed above and asks questions about how 
viewers perceive themselves as witnesses Ǯthroughǯ the media, how they relate to the 
witnesses Ǯinǯ the media, and what kind of assumptions they make about witnessing Ǯbyǯ 
the media. What these questions enable me to do is construct a Ǯtypology of witnessingǯ, 
which identifies in some detail the specific conditions upon which the experience of 
media witnessing may allow for certain forms of moral engagement and not others. This 
typology consists of four articulations of the witnessing experience, which I call here 
affective, ecstatic, politicised and detached witnessing. What this typology highlights is 
the complexity of audience engagement with news stories of distant suffering. This 
engagement is not limited to compassion or pity neither their assumed oppositional 
stances of compassion fatigue and denial. It is multidimensional and contingent upon 
the events witnessed, their textual representation by the media, as well as broader 
cultural and social discourses.  
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Affective Witnessing  
The use of affective language was particularly common in the participantsǯ accounts of 
their experience of witnessing distant disasters. Words like Ǯshockǯ, Ǯtouchedǯ or Ǯmovedǯ 
were often used to describe both their emotional reactions to the events on the screen 
and their feelings towards the victims. It is this type of witnessing, describing 
participantsǯ emotional reactions, that ) call Ǯaffective witnessingǯ. With regard to the 
three dimensions of witnessing, this type of audience engagement was characterised by 
intense emotional involvement with the human pain witnessed Ǯthroughǯ the media, 
empathetic identification with the suffering witnesses Ǯinǯ the media, but also a 
conditionality of this involvement on the sensationalist nature of the witnessing Ǯbyǯ the 
media. 
The construction of the affective witness was centred around two basic discursive 
elements: the description of an image singularising particular sufferers and the 
articulation of the affective impact of the image on the viewer. This dual argumentative 
structure is illustrated in the following quote of a viewer talking about his experience of 
the Tsunami disaster: 
Dimitris: The image of a girl, on its own, that was running…a girl that was crying 
non-stop, she had just found out that her parents were found drowned on a beach, 
and she runs and calls her little brother... Well, that was it! I was shocked at that 
point, I started crying on the spot!...When you see people on the screen…When you see their emotions…(ow can you do otherwise? You cry!  
(Male, 27, middle-class, Focus Group 8) 
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In articulating his position as a witness, this viewer combines two forms of reporting: the description of the victimǯs suffering, what Boltanski calls, the Ǯexternal reportǯ with the depiction of the viewerǯs emotional response to that description, or the Ǯinternal reportǯ, which expresses Ǯthe states through which the heart passesǯ ȋBoltanski, 1999: 
86). This kind of response confirms the power of visuals in capturing audienceǯs 
emotional imagination (Cohen, 2001: 173; Höijer, 2004: 520; Sontag, 2003: 85) and, in 
particular, the significance of the singularisation and personalisation of suffering 
(Boltanski, 1999: 11; Chouliaraki, 2006: 123). Victims singled out from the masses of 
sufferers become real people to whom audiences are able to relate to. Imagination thus 
becomes a moral force, in that it connects the viewer to the emotions of the sufferer and 
can form the basis for cosmopolitan empathy, as the capacity and willingness to take the 
perspective of the other (Beck, 2006: 6).   
The emphasis on the intense emotions instigated by the image of a particular 
suffering face has implications for both the viewersǯ perceived agency in relation to the 
suffering witnessed, as well as their engagement with the victims. First, the viewersǯ 
highly emotional involvement was coupled by the frustration of being unable to act 
upon the suffering. The following quote, from a discussion of the 2006 Lebanon war, 
which was taking place contemporarily with the research, is indicative: 
Olga: I see the child and I get goosebumps and I cry and then what; it doesnǯt stop, does it? )tǯs an embarrassment being a human being! And you tell yourself Ǯshame on me, )ǯd rather not switch the television on! So that ) donǯt get shamed over and over againǯ!  
(Female, in their 40s and 50s, middle-class, FG4) The viewersǯ intense emotional involvement with the scene of suffering also marks the 
limits of their engagement with it. The focus on the viewerǯ account is on her own 
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affective response rather than on the reality of the suffering. The expression of the viewerǯs inner emotions, the Ǯinternal reportǯ ȋBoltanski, ͳͻͻͻ: ͺ͸Ȍ, overshadows the 
description of the victimǯs reality in an indulgence to the audience emotionality. The mismatch between viewersǯ intense emotions and the perceived impossibility to act 
upon the suffering renders the former obsolete.   
Second, tied to images of specific people, the viewerǯs engagement seems to be 
conditional on an assumption of sameness connecting the audience to the victims. The 
following quote exemplifies this:  
Gerasimos: Whenever I see a human face I feel sorry as if it were my mother. 
There have been times when ) said Ǯshe could be my motherǯ… 
(Male, 56, middle-class, FG11) 
The sufferer, as a face that renders the pain imaginable, becomes an object of concern, 
reflection and emotional engagement. In this context, two seem to be the preconditions of the viewerǯs empathy towards the sufferer: first, the image of the human face, which 
renders the suffering visible (ǮWhenever ) see a human faceǯ) and, second, the 
assumption of the commonality of human pain, which renders the suffering of the other 
imaginable and relatable (Ǯshe could be my motherǯ). There is a certain degree of narcissism, however, in such expressions of empathy. The participantsǯ emotional 
connections to the sufferers are expressed on the assumption that the latter are people 
similar to them and thus experiencing and feeling things in similar ways.  
This illustrates an apparent collapse of distance between the spectators and the 
distant others on the basis of a perceived sameness. This is not to say that the physical 
distance has been ignored and eclipsed; rather, as Silverstone puts it, identification with the other entails Ǯthe elision of the different to the sameǯ and Ǯthe refusal to recognise 
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the irreducibility in othernessǯ ȋSilverstone, ʹͲͲ͹: Ͷ͹Ȍ. The specificity of the suffering 
and the particularities of the context it emerges in are neglected. 
This conditionality of empathy on the visibility of specific faces and human stories underlines the circumstantial character of the viewersǯ emotions and illustrates 
the problematic of particularisation, which lies at the heart of affective witnessing and, 
indeed, of the representation of suffering (Boltanski, 1999: 100). Characteristic of this difficulty in generalising viewersǯ emotional responses from the particularity of the 
pained face to the masses of the victims was the substitution of the empathetic 
references to specific sufferers by detached generalisations when referring to the 
entirety of sufferers, described through discursive practices of impersonalisation and 
objectification. In this way, the victims were described in the discussion as Ǯthe wretchedǯ (groups 2 and 8), Ǯthe hungryǯ (groups 1, 2 and 9), people who Ǯwould even eat the expired productsǯ (group 1) sent to them by charity organizations, the Ǯdead bodiesǯ or the Ǯdamnedǯ (group 8). Whereas the compelling image of individual sufferers 
instigated empathetic connections between the viewer and the distant other, general 
talk about the sufferers as a whole would construct them as aggregates of victims 
displacing their agency and emphasizing the irreducibility of difference between the 
viewer and the suffering other.  
The explicit visualisation of the pain of others was also at the centre of the viewerǯs critical engagement with the media stories as witnessing texts. Journalistic 
sensationalism, described as the morbid fascination of the media to focus on the most 
devastated was the main point of this criticism:  
Maria: Why should we see everything?! And they have this melodramatic music 
and they show the faces and then they go above the crying mother and they ask: Ǯ(ow do you feel?ǯ (ow should she be feeling?! 
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(Female, 45, middle-class, FG5) This critical engagement with the media is dependent on the viewersǯ ability to decipher 
and recognise regularities in the journalistic conventions of covering suffering 
(Boltanski, 1999: 84). Paradoxically, it was mostly these sensational images that also proved to be the participantsǯ anchoring point for emotional identification with the 
sufferer. When asked about their experience of the events, participants would often 
draw upon this repertoire of people crying over lost family members or similar images. 
Some would even admit that this is what mostly attracted them in the daily news 
bulletins. As one participant put it: 
If I have to be honest, itǯs always news of human pain that attract us…)t sells, thatǯs it! ) think itǯs awful, ) say this, and yet ) watch it! 
 (Female, 45, working-class, FG2) 
This seems to be a constitutive paradox in the mediated experience of 
witnessing: on the one hand, human pain, in order to be communicated and morally engaging, needs to focus on the human body in order to nourish the viewersǯ 
imagination (Peters, 2005: 118; 262); on the other hand, this focus on sensation and the 
bodily pain renders suffering into a spectacle and viewers into voyeurs, lending itself 
into the critique of sensationalism (Cohen, 2001: 204-205). In affective witnessing, the 
witnessing of the audience is closely linked to media images as witnessing texts; the 
viewers are affected by media representations in exactly the way they accuse the media 
of trying to affect them, failing to substantially challenge template journalistic reporting. 
In this context, affective witnessing as a type of audience engagement with distant 
suffering overall favours sentimentality over reflection and judgement.  
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Ecstatic witnessing 
There were two events that were exceptional within the participantsǯ narratives: the 
Tsunami of 2004, and September 11. Two were the commonalities in the discussions of 
these events: first, the expressions of emotional involvement, in a way similar to 
affective witnessing but at an intensified degree; second, a sense of immediacy of the 
experience of witnessing. Drawing on Chouliarakiǯs description of the coverage of 
September 11i, this witnessing is named here ecstatic witnessing (Chouliaraki, 2006). 
Characteristic of this type is that within the three dimensions of witnessing, viewers 
tend to move towards extreme positions of full immersion in the scene of suffering: 
intense emotional involvement with the events witnessed; unconditional empathy with 
the people suffering; and unquestioning acceptance of the media coverage.  As in the case of affective witnessing, the spectatorǯs emotional involvement is 
expressed in relation to particular images of the news reports. This time, however, it is 
not the specificity of suffering faces that the viewers find emotionally compelling but 
rather the urgency of the situation, conveyed through the use of live footage.  
Nana: I would catch myself thinking – the plane having crashed on the, letǯs say 
50th floor-, wondering Ǯwhat are the people up there doing? )s this the end? )s this it? ) mean, is their life over?...Oh, Godǯ!  
(Female, 26, middle-class, FG3) 
Watching the Tsunami was described in similar terms of a feeling of urgency:  
Tina: The moment that you would see the wave to emerge and you would see the people that were on the street being taken by the wave and then you wouldnǯt see 
them anymore and that was going on, this is what affected me the most. Because 
you would actually see the event.  
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(Female, 26, middle-class, FG1) There are two characteristics that render this emotional involvement Ǯecstaticǯ. 
First, the viewers position themselves as immediate witnesses, virtually present in the 
scene of suffering through the frequent use of temporal deixis, such as Ǯat that momentǯ, Ǯat that pointǯ, Ǯanymoreǯ.  Second, they are faced with the sublime spectacle of death and 
the fear it instigates. These two characteristics constitute a position of witnessing which 
is overwhelmed by emotion. The specificities of the suffering, the causes of the disaster 
and its broader impact seem irrelevant in light of the emotionally compelling images. 
This is not to say that both the Tsunami and the 9/11 attack were exclusively discussed 
in relation to the moments that the disasters took place. However, what the concept of 
ecstatic witnessing highlights is the construction of the viewer as a fully immersed 
witness in the scene of suffering on the basis of footage of scenes of death.  
The intensity of the experience of death as seen on the screen also forms the 
basis for the imaginative link between sufferer and spectator. The fear in the face of 
death brings to the fore the theme of a common humanity shared by viewers and victims. The expression of the respondentsǯ emotional involvement is indiscriminatingly 
addressed to the dying victims. The agency of the latter is constructed through their 
description as specific people with thoughts and emotions (ǮWhat are the people up there doing?ǯ). If in affective witnessing the victims were mostly recognised because of their status as Ǯideal victimsǯ ȋMoeller, ͳͻͻͻ: ͳͲ͹Ȍ, namely children and parents, which 
made their suffering imaginable, in ecstatic witnessing the sufferer appears to be 
identified as a universal human being marked by fear in the face of death.   
The sense of the temporality of viewing as synchronous to the one of suffering (Ǯ)s this the end?ǯ, ǮThe moment that you would see the wave…ǯ) also underlines the 
audience engagement with the media as witnessing texts. Viewers are drawn into the 
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scene of suffering as if they are watching it taking place in front of their eyes. They 
become witnesses par excellence, as indicated in this discussion about the collapse of 
the World Trade Centre:  )rini: …you actually went through this experience! …because you are actually 
waiting to see whether that person will manage to jump from the window or not, whether she will be saved from the fire… 
 (Female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Central in the symbolic construction of synchronicity is the usage of live footage, 
amateur in its majority, which creates the sense of a realistic depiction of the events as 
they unfold and, therefore, construct a direct link to the scene of suffering. The focus 
here is on mediation as immediacy, namely as the construction of suffering as it were happening in front of its spectatorsǯ eyes ȋChouliaraki, ʹͲͲ͸: ͵ͻȌ. The hypermediatic 
qualities of the medium, namely the semiotic and technological modes through which 
the suffering is staged, such as the camera shots and the narrative (ibid.), are ignored and almost forgotten by the viewers. Witnessing feels almost Ǯunmediatedǯ, as if the 
distance between the viewer and the scene of suffering is eclipsed so that the viewer witnesses Ǯliveǯ the death of others. )n this annihilation of the technological and 
symbolic qualities of mediation, the space for judgement of the media representational 
practices is also annihilated and the veracity gap between the suffering and its 
representation (Peters, 2001) is invisible.   
 
Politicised witnessing 
The third type of witnessing is named Ǯpoliticised witnessingǯ, due to the implication of 
political discourses in the audience discussions of their experience of mediated 
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suffering. ǮPoliticisedǯ is used here to describe discussions addressing relations of 
political and social power and inequality both at the global and the local level. It is not to 
be equated with the witnessing of political events; rather it refers to the way audience 
understanding of media stories is framed within a political discourse.  )f in affective and ecstatic witnessing, the viewerǯs emotional engagement was 
centred on specific images of suffering, in politicised witnessing there is a move from 
the specificity of the scene of suffering, and the witnessing provided by the media, to the 
search for causes and the attribution of blame and political responsibility for the events 
witnessed. This was the case in relation to suffering attributed to political reasons (for 
example, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were described as a compensation of the suffering 
Americans had inflicted elsewhere), as well as natural disasters (earthquakes and 
hurricanes, it was discussed, only result in so many victims due to the lack of 
appropriate infrastructures). In the following extract, a group of housewives are even 
attributing the Tsunami to manmade causes:  
Litsa: But who do you think caused the Tsunami? It is not only natural, a natural disaster…! The bombs the Americans throw…in the sea can also cause these things 
at some point.  
(Female, 45, working-class, FG2) The viewersǯ emotional involvement with the scene of suffering can be best summarised 
in feelings of indignation, addressed either to the perceived reasons that brought about 
the suffering, or, most often, to its perceived perpetrators. In a similar way, the high 
number of victims in the Kashmir earthquake of 2005 was attributed to the lack of 
infrastructure:  
Pavlos: They keep telling us about slum areas and stuff – but you are the one who 
wants the slum area to exist in the first place!... )f the state didnǯt want it to exist, 
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they would have kicked them out of there!...The state itself damns them to go 
through all these!    
(Male, 40, middle-class, FG6) 
What is also evident in the above is that indignation is expressed along an interpretative frame of conflict between Ǯusǯ and Ǯthemǯ, the latter being the ones to blame for the emergence of crises and the misfortune of the sufferers. This deictic Ǯtheyǯ would either 
stand for the Ǯstateǯ or Ǯstatesǯ or Ǯthe Americansǯ, as seen above or other referents that 
would alternate depending on the argumentative context.  
This conflict framework had a double function. On the one hand, it was employed as an illustration of discussantsǯ understanding of power, which at the same time 
fatalistically constructed them as powerless pawns on the global stage, mere spectators 
of the suffering of others.  
Simos: everything is initiated up there, everything. Everything depends on the 
people who have the power, either they are the state, or Kokkalisii, or Microsoft or the people who have the money…They donǯt care about the rest who are below 
them.  
(Male, 25, middle-class, FG1) 
On the other hand, this interpretative framework was also applied to the 
relationship between the viewers and the sufferers. The latter were in some way 
distinguished between deserving and undeserving victims. Exemplary cases were the 
US-related disasters, namely Hurricane Katrina and 9/11. The latter, as discussed 
above, was experienced as an instance of ecstatic witnessing, where the viewers were 
drawn into the scene of the disaster. However, when discussions would turn from 
human stories to the generality of the events, American victims would hardly be 
considered worthy of pity. 
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Hara: There were other things behind the events that were so shocking that I 
admit that during the specific disaster ) wasnǯt that moved…in the sense of human pain…Yes! ) mean, in the sense ǮOh, God, so many people have died!ǯ…of course I was really upset. But there was all this background behind it…how terrorism started being represented, how this was a reaction…) mean, really, during the 
Twin Towers disaster, I was fully desensitised! Maybe because they were Americans, ) donǯt know… 
(Female, 24, middle-class, FG1) 
Characteristic of this kind of talk was the fact that, whereas the sufferers would be described as the Ǯvictimsǯ in all other disasters, they would be identified as ‘the Americansǯ, when discussions would be about U.S. casualties. The identification of the 
victims in terms of their national identity was used to demarcate boundaries between 
them and the viewers, both spatial and emotional. The same kind of anti-American 
discourses were dominant in discussions of hurricane Katrina, the catastrophic 
aftermath of which was attributed to the inefficiency of the American government to 
take care of Ǯits peopleǯ. Such responses are expressive of a wide-spread and deeply 
rooted in Greek culture anti-Americanism, a result of both history and an Ǯunderdog cultureǯ, underlined by the image of the martyr nation that has suffered in the hands of 
the mighty powers (Stefanidis, 2007).  
The same kind of lay understanding of politics and power framed viewersǯ 
evaluation of media stories as witnessing texts. In a perceived universe of underlying 
political inequalities and struggles, the media are constructed as an ideological 
mechanism that serves the dominant hegemony. Expressive of this discourse were 
criticisms of Greek media for focusing on disasters taking place in the U.S.: 
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Tina: When the planes crashed on the Twin Towers in the States, the whole world 
stopped moving…A lot more people are being killed because of the wars 
Americans do. But then it was the States and all of us had to do something.  
(Female, 26, middle-class, FG1) 
Again, anti-American feelings are expressed as a distinction between Ǯthe Statesǯ and Ǯthe whole worldǯ or Ǯall of usǯ. What is also implicit in this quote is a criticism of the 
hierarchies of life that underline dominant media representational choices. Such 
criticisms, however, can be interpreted as part of a broader culture of suspicion towards 
institutions and the powerful rather than as a moral stance as a witness to the suffering 
of others, the misfortune of whom is absent or misrepresented in the mainstream 
media. 
 
Detached witnessing 
The final type of Ǯdetached witnessingǯ describes the experience of the suffering of 
others as something remote or ultimately irrelevant to the viewers' everyday life. The 
expression of affect, either as emotional identification or indignation, is overall absent 
from this kind of witnessing. It was mostly the younger respondents that would 
construct themselves as detached and Ǯmere spectatorsǯ of the events taking place on 
the television screen. The distinctive characteristics of this kind of discourse were the 
absence of affective language, the narration of the experience of witnessing as a 
sequence of events, and the emphatic construction of distance between the viewer and 
the scene of suffering. In this context, media reports as witnessing texts are being 
reconstructed in a way that renders their witnessing a story devoid of any moral 
imperative.  
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Indicative of this way of experiencing distant suffering is the following description 
of the Tsunami:  
Menelaos: There was an earthquake and then the tsunami was created, the sea was 
drawn in, seashells came to the surface…On the bottom there were starfish, different shells and stuff and they say, Ǯoh, cool, letǯs go to collect themǯ – no, seriously, thatǯs how it happened! They started, instead of going away, they stayed 
in the sea, they went further in, and then the tsunami came, the first and the 
second and the third, and took them.  
 (Male, in their 20s, middle-class, FG12) 
What mostly characterises this narrative of the experience of witnessing the Tsunami 
on the screen is the focus on the external report (Boltanski, 1999: 84) of the events as presented on the news. What is missing is the expression of the respondentsǯ emotional 
response. Indeed, the viewer is completely absent as an agent in these narratives, which 
consist of sequences of facts and images. Also absent is the suffering itself. 
Narrating distant suffering as a state of a generalised category of unfortunates, 
devoid of its specificity, seems to result in a failure to imagine the pain of the other. This 
lack of involvement with the scene of suffering is justified by the distance separating the 
viewers from the unfortunates:  )rini: Since we are outside of the situation, we only see it…we watch it just as…spectators…we canǯt really do anything, just a slight emotion…And then it somewhere far…which does not touch us... 
(Female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
Respondents justify their lack of emotional engagement by emphasising the distance 
with the scene of suffering, both emotional and geographical. It is this stark contradiction between the reality of the suffering on the screen and the viewersǯ 
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everyday life that fails to render the pain of the other imaginable and ultimately 
engaging for the viewer.  
In this context, victims are described as fleeting images on the screen, as part of a 
narrative, rather than presences that make claims to the viewersǯ emotions. There is no 
distinction between deserving and undeserving victims, however, there is a distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant suffering. And the measure of relevance seems to be 
proximity, based on conceptions of both geographical distance and community. 
According to one of the participants, for example, her lack of engagement with the 
Tsunami victims was justified because Ǯ)tǯs not next to us! )f it had happened next to us, I could totally see us all regretting it!ǯ. Later on, she explains that by Ǯnext to usǯ she 
means:  Nana: my family environment, my circle of friends, thatǯs it! My social environment…  
(Female, 26, middle-class, FG3) 
In some of the discussions, relevance was determined by national criteria too. In 
the following extract, one of the respondents is explaining why in the case of the 
Tsunami aftermath he was most interested in hearing about whether there were any 
Greek victims:  Nikos: You put yourself in the situation of the Greek…You donǯt put yourself 
into the situation of an African. You say, for example, I could have been there… 
(Male, 26, working-class, FG10) 
The moral space of care and emotional engagement is constructed through the use 
of spatial deictic terms, such as Ǯnext to usǯ. The narrow limits of this space include the 
locally situated social environment. In the way of detached witnessing, the distant other 
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fails to enter the moral space of the viewer. Ultimately, the object of concern is not the 
suffering itself but its implications for the viewer. The distant other is not unwelcome 
but also not morally and emotionally engaging; she is mostly indifferent and irrelevant.  
Emotionally disengaged from the spectacle of suffering and its victims, detached 
witnessing was characterised by a similarly disinterested evaluation of the role of media 
as witnessing texts, bringing the world closer to home. Discussing about the differential 
attention attributed by the media to the different disasters, respondentsǯ 
acknowledgement of it seemed to be devoid of any further kind of moral evaluation. 
Illustrative of this uncritical acceptance of media reporting was the reproduction 
of discourses of celebrity implicated in the coverage of the Tsunami disaster. The focus 
of some Greek media on the local celebrities that were travelling in the area at the time 
of the disaster, characteristic of the celebritisation of the Greek public life and the 
tabloidization of news (Plios, 2006) was, on the one hand, satirised by the viewers and, 
on the other hand, reproduced in their own discussions. Specifically, the story of a 
celebrity couple of television presenters that was holidaying in Thailand when the 
tsunami hit the area was widely reproduced by some of the younger participants, who 
were discussing the story as an integral part of the disaster. One of the participants 
started talking about the disaster by referring to the story of the couple, based on an 
interview with them she read in a lifestyle magazine: 
Nana: He says that things were not as tragic as they presented them, at least 
where he was...  
Irini: Alright, but werenǯt there a lot of victims?  
Nana: And then they had problems in leaving... 
 (Female, in their 20s, middle-class, FG3) 
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Characteristic in the narrative is the absence of actual victims of the disaster. Although 
one of the respondents is attempting to introduce this aspect, the focus continues to be 
on the celebrities and it is their account of the events that is being replicated. In this way, not only is the mediaǯs inattention to the actual suffering not addressed by the 
viewers but this omission is uncritically replicated by them too.  
 
Conclusion 
What the four types of media witnessing discussed here allow us to do is think about 
audience engagement with distant suffering in its plurality and diversity of expressions. 
Albeit non-exhaustive or mutually exclusive, the four types of witnessing dissect audience responses that have hitherto been rather uniformly described as Ǯcompassionǯ ȋ(öijer, ʹͲͲͶȌ, Ǯcompassion fatigueǯ ȋMoeller, ͳͻͻͻȌ, Ǯdesensitisationǯ ȋSeu, ʹͲͲ͵Ȍ or Ǯmoral apathyǯ ȋSeu, 2010). They describe the mediated experience of human pain as a 
complex process, which cannot be assumed or predetermined by the nature of the 
suffering or its media representation. Media witnessing, as illustrated here, is 
contingent both on the nature and the mode of reporting particular disasters and 
broader social and political discourses viewers employ in making sense of the events.  
In this context, the moral engagement of the viewer with the distant other is 
constructed in distinctive ways. On the one hand, affective and ecstatic witnessing 
describe the empathetic connection of the spectator with the sufferer, in a way of 
cosmopolitan empathy, as the willingness to take the perspective of the distant other 
(Beck, 2006: 6). However, and although the moral imagination of the spectator as 
illustrated within these two types moves beyond the limits of existing communities, this 
imagination is also delimited, first, by being bound to particular images of suffering, 
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and, second, due to its over-indulgence in the sentimentality of the viewer. On the other 
hand, politicised and detached witnessing have described the viewer as positioned 
within the moral space of the national and local. In all four dimensions of witnessing, 
therefore, the cosmopolitan imagination is constructed as limited and fragmented.  
At the same time, this typology opens up further questions for empirical 
exploration when considered in relation to technological advances and the widespread 
use of social media that challenge both the primacy of televisionǯs audio-visual 
characteristics in the mediation of witnessing and the triangle of communication 
entailed in media witnessing, discussed above. With the explosion of social media and 
the subsequent developments in citizen journalism (Allan, 2013), media witnessing takes place in a media saturated environment that provides Ǯan open and instantaneous online structure of information and action, unprecedented in disaster reportingǯ 
(Chouliaraki, 2010: 309).  
Two are the main issues raised in this continuously changing media environment 
with regard to the concept of media witnessing as discussed here. The first concerns the 
possible transformation of the communicative triangle of media witnessing consisting of 
the audience, the journalists and the suffering victims. Audiences are now able to report the world as they see it through the use of social media, challenging the Ǯauthorshipǯ of 
the mediators of media witnessing, the journalists (Ashuri and Pinchevski, 2009: 145). 
This in its turn poses the issue of authenticity and trust in user-generated content as a 
news source of secondary witnessing, as well as the question of how such instances of 
citizen journalism compete or become ultimately embedded within mainstream media, 
which at large retain their dominance in defining newsworthiness. Second, further 
questions are being raised about the moral implications of living in a media-saturated, 
real-time news environment, which places audiences in a position of constant vigilance 
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of the outside world, and renders the distant other a virtually constant presence in the 
media space. The analytical framework presented here offers a point of entry to such an 
enquiry by placing audience engagement not only in relation to the media and the 
witnessing they provide, but also within discourses at play in viewersǯ everyday life. It is 
within this complex context that the increased technological opportunities for media 
witnessing have to be examined. How media witnessing can be transformed under these 
conditions and whether it can formulate the basis for a cosmopolitan outlook is a 
question open to continuous enquiry. 
 
 
 
i Chouliaraki uses the term ǲecstatic newsǳ to describe the coverage of September ͳͳ, as an event that was broadcast both as ǲa local tragedyǳ and as ǲglobal political factǳ, in terms of its spatiality; and both as ǲcontingentǳ, ǲlived experienceǳ, and as historical in 
terms of its temporality (Chouliaraki, 2006: 158).  
 
ii A Greek businessman.  
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